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Concentration or dispersion of retail stores is the result of market interactions. If it involves market 
failures, then the spatial location equilibrium of retail stores is not optimal in terms of social welfare. 
We investigate two important market failures involving retail store location: “monopolistic 
competition among retail stores” and “shopping externality caused by multipurpose shopping”. Retail 
store locations in market equilibrium and those in a social optimum are derived. Next, we show that 
the degree of hollowing-out of urban centers is not always excessive from the perspective of the social 
optimum. It is believed that hollowing-out of urban commercial centers harms social welfare. But on 
the contrary, if the accessibility of suburban areas from residential areas is lower than that of the urban 
center, we confirm that hollowing-out of urban commercial centers is desirable. In this case, promotion 
of retail stores’ location in urban center, such as subsidies to locate in the city center or restrictions on 
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1. We show a divergence of the market boundary of retail stores between the market equilibrium and 
social optimum. 
2. We find that the degree of hollowing-out of urban centers is not always excessive from the 
perspective of social welfare.  
3. Hollowing-out of urban centers is excessive if the accessibility of suburban areas from residential 
areas is higher than that of the central commercial area. 
4. Retail store location in suburban areas does not always harm social welfare. It depends on the 






Hollowing-out of urban commercial center is a recent urban problem at issue because it is 
believed that it should worsen social welfare. In our paper, considering two important market failures 
involved in retail store location: “monopolistic competition among retail stores” and “shopping 
externality caused by multipurpose shopping”, we explore hollowing-out of urban commercial centers 
from the perspective of social welfare. 
Spatial allocation of retail stores, including concentration and hollowing-out, is an outcome of 
market equilibrium. Therefore, the allocation is socially optimal if there are no market failures. Why 
do people believe that hollowing-out of urban commercial center harm social welfare? We guess that 
they believe concentration of commerce brings agglomeration economy. It is certainly common that 
the productivity of firms is influenced by proximity to other firms.1 
Retail store location is footloose in the sense that stores’ locations are less constrained by inputs 
such as resources and labor supplies. Large markets are more attractive for retail stores. Their profit-
seeking location brings concentration of many kinds of retail stores in urban areas. Therefore, a main 
cause of the recent hollowing-out is the suburbanization of commerce which results from motorization, 
improvement of transportation networks, and the expansion of suburban areas over the last few decades. 
Again, Hollowing-out of urban commercial centers is not optimal if it involves technological 
externalities attributed to market failures. In fact, the relevant literature has described several factors 
of market failure in commerce: 1) spatial price competition of commercial location, 2) imperfect 
competition among retail stores, and 3) shopping externality (O’Sullivan (1993)) caused by 
multipurpose (one-stop) shopping. We will review some relevant studies. 
First, 1) “spatial price competition of commercial locations” is a phenomenon among firms that 
supply a homogeneous good. Hotelling’s “ice cream vendor” problems (Hotelling (1929)) serve as an 
illustrative example. Each firm decides its price and the location under the prevailing competition with 
neighboring firms in the market area. Spatial price competition is examined in many studies using the 
framework of that model (see e.g., Cappoza and Order (1978), Anderson, de Palma and Thisse (1992), 
and Beckmann (1999)). However, although this spatial competition framework can represent 
 
1 In the United States, the suburbanization of cities advanced explosively during the 1970s, but it was followed by the 
decay of city centers. In Germany and France in the 1970s, the necessity for revitalization of city centers was a common 
theme for policymakers and researchers. It remains an important policy issue in the United Kingdom. Following such 
trends in the US and Europe, since regulations of commercial development in suburban areas were loosened in Japan in 
the 1990s, the hollowing-out of urban commercial centers in most small cities has become an increasingly important social 
issue. 
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competition among suburban retail stores such as the same-sized shopping malls, gas stations, and 
convenience stores, it is not useful to consider goods of various kinds supplied in the urban center and 
suburban areas. Therefore, we investigate the two remaining factors of market failure. 
Next, we review 2) “imperfect competition among stores”. Agglomeration of retail stores is 
advantageous for each because it creates an attractive area for consumption and more consumers visit 
the region. However, it can be disadvantageous for each; agglomeration of retail stores brings 
competition from other retail stores. In an urban center, a wide variety of retail stores locate and 
mutually compete for profits. Such a competitive framework is monopolistic competition. With price 
competition, each retail store differentiates its services and assortment to compete with other retail 
stores. To represent such locations of differentiated retail stores, the monopolistic competition model 
is suitable. Monopolistic competition is modeled by Dixit and Stiglitz (1977). The Dixit–Stiglitz model 
has already been used in many papers for analyses of various problems related to spatial issues2. The 
formulation of monopolistic competition in our model follows that of Fujita et al. (1999). 
We review 3) “shopping externality (O’Sullivan (1993)) caused by multipurpose (one-stop) 
shopping”. If different categories of retail stores are agglomerated in one region, then consumers can 
purchase goods of several kinds with one trip, which is so-called “multipurpose shopping” or “one-
stop shopping”. Consequently, agglomeration of retail stores provides a positive externality for 
consumers, which was designated as the “shopping externality” (but not fully demonstrated with a 
model) by O’Sullivan (1993).  
Some papers have explained the mechanics generating commercial agglomeration with the 
existence of shopping externality. Wolinsky (1983) explains information asymmetries between stores 
and consumers cause a commercial agglomeration that sells imperfectly substitute goods. Information 
asymmetries mean that consumers do not know the price and the quality of goods perfectly until they 
visit each store. De Palma et al. (1985) show that the agglomerated configuration of three or more 
retail stores at the market center is stable in a Hotelling location model if goods are sufficiently 
differentiated and if the transport costs are sufficiently low. Ago (2008) presents the same result as 
that of de Palma et al. (1985) in the case of monopolistic competition. These papers present interesting 
implications for the formation of agglomeration. Ago (2008) demonstrates that monopolistic 
competition is a cause of agglomeration of firms in a Hotelling location model. However, he does not 
address shopping externality, which is one cause of agglomeration of retail stores. Additionally, neither 
paper addresses the change in utility level by transportation improvement, which the current paper 
 
2 See, e.g., Fujita et al. (1999) and Baldwin et al. (2003). 
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targets. Kishi et al. (2015) explore a spatial price competition model with central and outlying 
commercial areas through a simple extension of Capozza and Van Order (1978). However this paper 
does not consider monopolistic competition with a variety of goods. 
In our shopping behavior, we spend much time and money on obtaining some of our favorite 
goods. Therefore, consumers have the benefit of saving the cost for comparison of goods if there is a 
commercial agglomeration that sells imperfectly substitute goods. Accordingly, the shopping 
externality has a much greater impact on our choice of shopping place. Furthermore, if a commercial 
agglomeration sells complementary goods, then consumers have the benefit of purchasing goods of 
several kinds in one-stop shopping and can therefore save transport costs. These merits for consumers 
increase the demand accruing to neighboring stores. 
Such shopping behavior of consumers is modeled in the previous literature (see e.g., Hanson 
(1980), Mulligan (1985, 1987), and Ingene and Ghosh (1990)). Our model, proposed in Section 2, 
specifically examines one-stop shopping behavior in the same manner as many previous studies3. 
Some analyze retail store location. For example, Eaton and Lipsey (1982) show the mechanism of 
retail store agglomeration caused by one-stop shopping behavior. Henkel et al. (2000) model one-stop 
shopping behavior to analyze coalition formation among retail service suppliers. Tabuchi (2009) 
models self-organization marketplaces under a one-stop shopping situation. Those previous papers 
focus on agglomeration mechanisms, while our research focuses on welfare analyses. 
The existence of these two factors of market failure, monopolistic competition and shopping 
externality, brings socially “non-optimal” spatial allocation of retail stores in market equilibrium. As 
described above, these two factors are very common in an environment of retail store competition and 
consumer shopping activity. Uschev et al. (2015) introduce these two factors and study competition 
between urban retail stores and suburban retail stores. They focus on government regulation of retail 
store location. Their study is related to our objective. However, they assume a linear city which has a 
market place at each edge, and therefore transportation costs of both market places only depend on the 
distance from the residential area. Our study explores asymmetric transport improvements (e.g. 
construction of a public transportation system to the urban center or improvement of road facilities in 
the outskirts of the city). 
 
3 Several papers model such consumer behaviour with random utility frameworks (see e.g. Popkowski et al. (2004) and 
Sinha (2000)) or the hazard model (see e.g. Popkowski et al. (2000)). In these models, all consumers buy goods at all 
shopping clusters scattered geographically. However, as Christaller (1933) modeled the hierarchical marketplace, a large 
marketplace usually has all kinds of products supplied in a smaller marketplace. In this case, modelling one-stop shopping 
behavior is sufficient for our papert’s purpose by appropriately adjusting the time interval.  
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In summary, our research objective is to analyze how these two factors affect consumer welfare 
through the change in retail store location caused by transportation improvement. From our analysis, 
we can theoretically clarify if hollowing-out or suburbanization of commerce caused by transportation 
improvement harm social welfare or not. 
In the rest of our paper, we first outline the model in Section 2. Then, in Section 3 we derive 
retail stores’ location in market equilibrium and in social optimum. We derive how transport 
improvement changes consumers’ welfare depending on the retail store location by comparative statics 
with respect to transportation cost. Section 4 explains how social welfare changes with respect to 
transportation improvement through the change in retail store location. Section 5 concludes the paper. 
 
2 Model 
2.1 Image of the city  
We consider a linear residential area, which is expressed as a line segment where homogeneous 
consumers are distributed uniformly and continuously. The total population of consumers is fixed as 
N . Each consumer resides on a plot of land, the length of which is normalized to 1. Consequently, the 
length of the line segment is N . 
Each of the two ends of the interposed residential area has a transportation facility to a commercial 
area. Figure 1 shows that the transportation facilities are represented as “TF1” and “TF2”. The two 
commercial areas are called, respectively, “region 1” and “region 2”. Retail stores locate in the two 
commerce regions 1 and 2. However, they are not allowed to locate in the housing area. In real cities 
also, zoning regulations restrict large-size store locations in housing areas. Moreover, most cities have 
a central commercial area and suburban shopping centers. The two commercial regions in the model 
can be interpreted as them. In both regions, retail stores choose their locations in the existence of 
monopolistic competition4. Considering the transportation cost and the variety of the commodities that 
are supplied, each consumer purchases goods at either region. No congestion arises in relation to their 
shopping trips. 
For convenience of our consideration, we merely assume that region 1 is an urban center, whereas 
region 2 is on the outskirts of a city. However, no technical difference exists among retail stores in 
regions 1 and 2 in the model. The exchange of 1 and 2 would not influence the following analysis. 
 
4 For simplification, we do not model the land market of commercial areas. In our model, retail stores can locate anywhere 
with no land rent. Our conclusions are fundamentally identical to those in the case in which the land market is introduced 
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Figure 1 Shape of the City 
 
2.2 Transportation cost 
Transportation in the residential area and transportation facilities TF1 and TF2 requires some monetary 
expense, although it is costless in commercial areas5. It invariably compels consumers to purchase 
widely various goods during one shopping trip to save transportation costs between the residence and 
the commercial area. The greater the amount of goods obtained in one shopping trip, the lower the 
transportation cost per good. Put differently, scale economies relate to the consumers’ shopping trips. 
To save their transportation cost, rational consumers purchase goods of many kinds in one shopping 
trip. 
It is assumed that the transportation cost per unit distance in the residential area is one, and that the 
travel cost of TF1 is 1t , and that of TF2 is 2t . Therefore, for the nth consumer from region 1, the 
respective transportation costs  1L n  for region 1 and  2L n  for region 2 are given as  1 1L n n t   and 
   2 2L n N n t   . 
 
2.3 Consumer behavior 
 
5 There is usually sufficient distance between the residential area and the commercial area; therefore, consumers spend a 
certain amount of transportation cost. However, in a commercial area, they will have lower transportation costs because 
retail stores are agglomerated. Our simplification is based on such circumstances. 
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In our model, we specifically examine one-shopping trip behaviour of consumers in a certain fixed 
time interval, as assumed by Eaton and Lipsey (1982). Each consumer shares a log linear utility 
function: 
 ln 1 lni i iV M A    .   (1) 
Therein, subscript i  means that the consumer shops in region i , iM  represents a composite index of 
the consumption of commercial goods6,  iA  denotes the consumption of a numeraire good of which the 
price is one, and   signifies a constant representing the expenditure share of commercial goods. The 
quantity index, iM , is a sub-utility function defined over a continuum of varieties of commercial goods. 
In addition,  im x  denotes the consumption of each available variety; if  denotes the number of goods 
sold in region i , which is equivalent to the number of retail stores, and   is the elasticity of 
substitution between any two varieties. We assume that iM  is defined by a constant elasticity of 
substitution (CES) function: 
  110 ifi iM m x dx
        . 
Given income Y  and price  ip x  for each commercial good, and transportation costs for region i , 
the consumers’ budget constraint is 
     0 ifi i i iA p x m x dx L n Y   . 
The nth consumers’ utility maximization is represented as 
 ,max . .i i i i i i iM A V s t A G M L n Y  　　 .   (2) 
Therein, iG  is the price index of commercial goods supplied in region i . Because it is assumed that 
no technical difference exists among retail stores, all commercial goods are sold at the same price *p . 
Therefore, iG  is represented as 
  11 11 * 10 ifi iG p x dx p f
 
      .   (3) 
 
6 Horizontally differentiated goods are goods that have elasticity of substitution with each other. In a real economy, a large 
number of retail stores supply quite a variety of goods: food, clothes, electronic equipment, furniture, and so on. Some 
have no elasticity of substitution with other goods. We specifically examine retail stores, which supply horizontally 
differentiated goods. Other goods are regarded as numeraire goods in the same manner as described in the literature (see 
e.g. Tabuchi (2009)). 
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Maximized utility by consumers’ utility maximization (2), is expressed as a function of income, 
price of retail stores and number of goods, giving the indirect utility function 
   1*ln 1 ln ln1i i iV Y L fp

  
         .  (4) 
Equation (4) is derived from maximizing the utility of an nth consumer who goes shopping in region 
i . The first term in eq. (4) is a function of the good price; the second term is that of income. The third 
term is that of the number of kinds of goods. In eq. (4), iL  is a function of n , which represents the 
place where the consumer lives, whereas if  is a function of market boundary b  (see Appendix A). 
Therefore, we have 
 ,i iV V n b , 
which is a utility function of an nth consumer to visit region i  when the market boundary is b . 
 
2.4 Retail store behavior 
Each retail store supplies a horizontally differentiated good under conditions of free entry and exit. 
Under monopolistic competition, they do not supply the same kind of good as the others. Therefore, 
their number in a region is equivalent to the number of kinds of goods. 
The technology is the same in both regions: it involves a fixed input cost F  and marginal input cost 
requirement c. Consequently, the production of a quantity q of any good at any location requires the 
cost given as F cq . 
Considering a particular retail store supplying a specific good, its profit,  , is given as 
pq F cq    , 
where p  is the mill price. Its price index, iG , is given for each retail store because it is determined 
according to all retail stores in region i . The perceived elasticity of demand is therefore  . 




        (5) 
for all retail stores. Given the pricing rule, the profit is 
1
1 cq F   . 
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Therefore, the zero-profit condition implies that equilibrium output *q  is 
 * 1Fq c
  .    (6) 
It is constant for every active retail store in the economy. 
The number of kinds of goods in each region, if , depends on the demand in each region. Put 
differently, if  is a function of the market area size, equivalent to the number of consumers who visit 
the region. Differentials of 1f  and 2f  with respect to their own market areas are 
 1 1 0f Y b tb F


      and     2 2 0f Y N b tFN b        7. 
They show that the expansion of the market area increases the variety of goods in the region. It 
corresponds to such a situation that increasing consumers makes the commercial area more attractive 
for retail stores from the standpoint of profit and the start of new retail store operations. 
 
3 Market equilibrium and social optimum 
3.1 Market boundary under market equilibrium 
Let mb  be the market boundary under market equilibrium. If 0 mb N  , then consumers at  0, mn b  
go shopping in region 1, whereas consumers at  ,mn b N  go shopping to region 2. We call this 
market equilibrium ‘interior equilibrium’ (IE). If 0mb   or mb N , then all consumers go to one 
region for shopping, region 1 ( mb N ) or region 2 ( 0mb  ). We call this market equilibrium ‘corner 
equilibrium’ (CE).  
Under IE, the consumer on a market boundary is indifferent to visiting either region. If the utility 
obtained from visiting one region is higher than that of another region for all consumers, then the IE 
does not exist and all consumers go to one region for shopping, which corresponds to CE. The 
condition of IE and CE is expressed as the following. 
 
IE:  0,mb N  and    1 2, ,m m m mV n b b V n b b   8  (7a) 
 
7 The derivation is explained in Appendix A. 
8  ,m miV n b b  shows the utility of a consumer on market boundary when he or she visits region i . 
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CE: 0mb   and    1 20,0 0, 0V n V n  　 , 
or mb N  and    1 2, ,V n N N V n N N     (7b) 
A stability condition is necessary for the IE (  0,mb N ). It is shown as 
    1 2, , 0V n b b V n b b b      ,   (8) 
which expresses that any consumer’s change in a region for shopping decreases their own utility level. 
In this situation, no consumer has an incentive to change the shopping destination. 
To capture the configuration of  ,iV n b b  with respect to market boundary, differentiating 






V n b b f
b Y b t b f


          
and  (9a) 
 
     2 2 22
, 1 1
1
V n b b f
fN b Y N b t N b


            . (9b) 
 
The first terms in eqs. (9a) and (9b) are negative, whereas the second terms are positive. We can derive 
the following properties: 
 1 ,V n b b b      when 0b  ,    2 ,V n b b N b      when 0N b  , 
  22 1 , 0V n b b b    , and    22 2 , 0V n b b N b     . 
Therefore,  ,iV n b b  is concave with respect to b . 
Figure 2 shows examples of the configuration of  ,iV n b b  derived by numerical simulation. In 
Fig. 2, the horizontal axis expresses the market area of each region: b , starting from the left, is the 
market area of region 1, equivalent to the number of consumers who visit region 1, and N b , starting 
from the right, is the market area of region 2, equivalent to the number of consumers who visit region 
2. The difference in shape between  1 ,V n b b  and  2 ,V n b b  arises only from the difference of it , 
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transportation cost depending on transportation facilities, which is included in the second and third 
terms in eq. (4)9. 
The left side in Fig. 2 shows the case in which the difference between 1t  and 2t  is not so large 
( 1 20t  , 2 25t  ), whereas the right side is the case in which the difference between 1t  and 2t  is large 
( 1 20t  , 2 40t  ). The remaining exogenous variables and parameters are fixed throughout the 
numerical simulations in this paper ( 0.2  , 2  , 250Y  , 20F  , 3c  , and 100N  ). The graph on 
the left side has three intersections of  1 ,V n b b  and  2 ,V n b b  whereas the graph on the right side 
has one intersection. 
 
ie 
Figure 2 Configuration of   ,iV n b b  and market boundary with market equilibrium 
 
Among the three intersections in the left-hand graph in Fig. 2, only 57.9mb   satisfies the stability 
condition (8). That means both CEs and IE exist if the difference between 1t  and 2t  is small. In the 
right-hand graph, the intersection does not satisfy the stability condition (8). That means only CEs 
exist if the difference between 1t  and 2t  is small. 
 
3.2 Market boundary under social optimum 
 
9 The second and third terms in eq. (4) include if , which is a function of it , as shown in Appendix A. 
 13 
We define social welfare SW  as the sum of individuals’ utility levels shown as 
   1 20 , ,b NN bSW V n b dn V n b dn   , 
in which the first term is the sum of utility levels of consumers who visit region 1, whereas the second 
term is the sum of the utility levels of consumers who visit region 2. 
Let sb  be the market boundary under social optimum. SW  is not concave with respect to b . 
Moreover, it is not obvious whether SW  is a monotonically increasing or decreasing function of b. 
Therefore, we cannot derive the condition which sb  satisfies. However, if we assume 0 sb N  , 
then sb  satisfies first-order condition 0SW b   , shown as 
 
       1 1 2 2, , , ,s s s sV n b EX n b V n b EX n b   , where  (10) 





b V n b Y t bEX b dn bb Y t


       and  (11a) 









Y t N bV n bEX b dnN b N bY t


       
 .  (11b) 
 
Comparing eq. (7a) to eq. (10), the difference of the condition between market equilibrium and 
social optimum is the second term in eq. (10), represented as 1EX  and 2EX . They express that technical 
externality arises from multipurpose shopping and monopolistic competition. Equations (11a) and 
(11b) show that the change in utility caused by the infinitesimal change in market area  ,iV n b b   
applies to all consumers who visit region i . Put differently, if consumers switch their own personal 
destination from a marketplace to the other marketplace, then it changes not only their own utility but 
also that of all other consumers through the change in the number of goods in the region. 
 
3.3 Comparing market equilibrium to social optimum 
We quantitatively explore the relation between mb , the market boundary with the market equilibrium, 
and sb , that with social optimum. mb  can be IE and CE, therefore we determine them individually. 
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To capture the configuration of    ,i iV n b b EX b   with respect to market boundary, we must 
capture the configuration of  iEX b . We can derive the following properties from eq. (11a) and (11b): 
   1 1EX b     when 0b  ,    2 1EX b     when 0N b  , 1 0EX b   , and 
 2 0EX N b    . From these properties, we can draw the shape of  ,iV n b b  and 
   ,i iV n b b EX b   and corresponding SW  as Fig. 3, which is derived through numerical simulation. 
In Fig. 3,  ,iV n b b  is drawn as a solid line,    ,i iV n b b EX b   is drawn as a dashed line, and the 
corresponding SW  is drawn as a chain line. 
In Fig. 3, three stable market boundaries with market equilibria are shown. One is mb  which 
corresponds to the intersection of  1 ,V n b b  and  2 ,V n b b  (interior equilibrium, IE); the others are 
0mb    and mb N   (corner equilibrium, CE). Socially optimum market boundary sb   is the 
intersection of    1 1,V n b b EX b   and    2 2,V n b b EX b  10. 
The CEs ( 0mb   and mb N ) can be stable market equilibria in Fig. 3. Either one of the two CEs 
( 0mb   or mb N ) implies that consumers are caught in a “utility trap”. At each CE, an individual’s 
change in shopping region decreases that individual’s utility level. Therefore no one changes their 
shopping region, and SW  is far from the optimum level.  
 
Figure 3 Configuration of     ,i iV n b b EX b   and corresponding SW  (IE and CEs) 
 
 
10 Numerical simulation confirms that the social optimum is the interior solution.  
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However, if some large number of individuals change shopping regions simultaneously, then the utility 
level of each increases. They extricate themselves from a “utility trap” and the market boundary heads 
for IE. 
The left side in Fig. 3 shows the case in which region 1 and region 2 are homogeneous; 1 2t t  
( 1 2 20t t  ). In this case,  1 ,V n b b  and  2 ,V n b b  are symmetric. Therefore mb  and sb  are just 
middle: 2m sb b N  . The right side in Fig. 3 shows the case in which 1 2t t  ( 1 20t  , 2 30t  ). The 
increase in 2t  affects the decrease in budget for goods in consumers who visit region 2. Therefore 
 2 ,V n b b  moves downward. In consequence, mb  and sb  are moved to the right. 
In our model, the difference between mb  and sb  is determined by the difference between 1t  and 
2t . It is theoretically derived that m sb b  if 1 2t t  and m sb b  if 1 2t t . The derivation of this property 
is shown in Appendix B. 
Because of monopolistic competition and shopping externality, socially optimal sb  differs from 
mb  if the transportation cost to region 1 and region 2 differ ( 1 2t t ). It is interpreted that a commercial 
area’s retail stores are agglomerated excessively if the accessibility from the residential area is better 
than that of another commercial area. 
 
Figure 4 Configuration of     ,i iV n b b EX b   and corresponding SW  (CEs) 
 
If the difference between 1t  and 2t  is large, then stable IE does not exist and only CE ( 0mb   and 
mb N ) exists. Figure 4 shows the case in which 2t  is much larger than 1t  ( 1 20t  , 2 40t  ). The CE 
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( 0mb  ) in Fig. 4 implies that consumers are caught in a “utility trap”. At the CE ( 0mb  ), SW  is at 
its minimum. If consumers escape a “utility trap”, then by the same token, the market boundary heads 
for another CE ( mb N ). Numerical simulation clarifies that sb N . 
 
4 Transportation improvement and hollowing-out of urban commercial centers 
Regarding region 1 and region 2 as the urban center and the outskirts of a city in our model, we express 
the process of hollowing-out of urban commercial centers because of transportation improvement in 
suburban area, which corresponds to TF2 in our model.  
 
4.1 Transportation improvement and change in equilibrium 
Fig. 5 shows a stable market boundary under market equilibrium and that under social optimum 
corresponding to the change in 2t ; 1t  is fixed as 1 20t  . Market boundary under market equilibrium is 
shown as a solid line whereas that under social optimum is shown as a dashed line. 
 
 
Figure 5 Bifurcation of market boundary and social optimum 
 
As shown in Section 3, CEs ( 0mb   or mb N ) exist in any 2t . Under 28.04 35.01t  , IE 
( 0 mb N  ) also exists in addition to CEs. 
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4.2 Emergence of a new marketplace 
From a historic perspective, formulation of cities were begun with an agglomeration of 
commerce in one marketplace. Therefore, almost every city has a city center, which has agglomeration 
of commerce. In our model, CE ( mb N ) corresponds to such formulation of cities that a city has only 
one agglomeration of retail store in city center (region 1) and all consumers go shopping in the city 
center (region 1). We assume this CE as the initial state11. 
With transportation improvement to region 2 from the initial state,   becomes small and 
moves upward in Fig. 4. Decreasing  from the initial state eventually generates IE, 
intersection of   and . Therefore, transportation improvement to region 2 creates 
the potential for retail stores to locate in region 2 with some other retail stores. If some retail stores 
locate simultaneously in region 2, then consumers living near region 2 can improve their utility by 
changing their shopping place from region 1 to region 2. Their utility losses occur by having fewer 
kinds of goods available in the outskirts, but they can obtain higher utility by saving transportation 
costs. 
The introduction of many new retail stores into region 2 is the formation of a new marketplace 
in region 2. Formation of a new marketplace at the edge of a residential area is explored in Tabuchi 
(2009). The increasing number of consumers surrounding a central marketplace expands the residential 
area to the outskirts. Therefore, transportation costs from the outskirts to the central marketplace 
increase. Eventually, an increase in population causes the formation of an “edge city”, which is a new 
marketplace at the edge of a residential area. Our model fixes the population of consumers. However, 
expanding the residential area to the outskirts is equivalent to that of transportation improvement in 
region 2 in the sense that the transportation cost for the outskirts becomes low compared to that for the 
city center for consumers living near the outskirts. 
In order to formulate a new marketplace in the outskirts (region 2), each retail store requires a 
certain number of other retail stores. That is, concerted conglomerate of retail stores can locate in the 
outskirts (region 2). This conglomerate corresponds to a shopping mall, which provides a wide variety 
of goods. This bifurcation from CE to IE,  observed under 2 35.01t   in Fig. 4, improves social welfare. 
It means that location of a conglomerate of retail stores in the outskirts should be promoted from the 
perspective of social welfare improvement. 
 
11 Cities are historically formulated around one marketplace as a general rule. Therefore, if the transportation cost for the 
outskirts is sufficiently large, the corresponding CE is such that all retail stores are located in the city center. 
2t
 2 ,V n b b 2t
 1 ,V n b b  2 ,V n b b
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When 23.90 8.04t  , IE does not exist in market equilibrium. However, socially optimal 
boundary is 0 mb N  . Therefore, it means that location of a certain number of retail stores in the 
outskirts should be promoted even though there is no potential for collective retail stores to locate in 
the outskirts with some other retail stores from the perspective of social welfare maximization. 
 
4.3 Controlling hollowing-out and suburbanization 
Transportation improvement in the outskirts of a city is a main cause of the hollowing-out of 
shopping centers and suburbanization of retail stores. In fact, our model demonstrates that a decrease 
in  makes  smaller. Improving access to the outskirts of a city expands the market area of retail 
stores in the outskirts in a city. 
Comparing the market boundary with the market equilibrium  and that with social optimum 
,  if , and  if . If the accessibility for the outskirts is worse ( ), then 
the market area of the outskirts under market equilibrium is smaller than that under social optimum 
(  ). Therefore policies for regulation of suburbanization of retail stores or promotion and 
revitalization of retail stores in the city center decrease social welfare if the accessibility for the 
outskirts is worse. 
Such regulation or promotion improves the utility of consumers who visit city centers through a 
decrease in transportation cost and increases the variety of retail stores in city centers. However, it 
simultaneously brings utility loss to consumers who visit the outskirts through a decrease in the variety 
of retail stores in the outskirts. Under the situation in which accessibility to the outskirts is worse, the 
utility loss is greater than the improvement of the utility. 
Conversely, if the degree of suburbanization is large ( ), then the market boundary with 
market equilibrium is smaller than that with social optimum ( ). Therefore policies for regulation 
of suburbanization of retail stores or promotion and revitalization of retail stores in city centers increase 
social welfare if accessibility to the outskirts is better. 
Hollowing-out of an urban center’s commerce has been promoted during the past few decades in 
developed countries as described early in this paper. In such countries, road construction and improvement in 
outlying areas is well underway. Therefore we can regard suburbanization of retail stores as excessive and the 
regulation of suburbanization of retail stores or promotion and revitalization of retail stores in the city center as 









4.4 Complete suburbanization and hollowing-out 
Under circumstances in which transportation cost for region 1 and region 2 are similar, the IE 
comes into existence, retail stores locating in both regions. We assume that retail stores locate in both 
regions ( ) under 28.04 35.01t  , given the initial state. 
Promoting transportation improvement for region 2 from the initial state,  becomes small and 
 moves upward in Fig. 2. Decreasing  from the initial state eventually eliminates IE and 
generates a CE. If consumers cooperate to move in search of a better equilibrium, then the CE by 
which all retail stores locate in region 2 comes into existence. This change in equilibrium from the IE 
(  ) to the CE (  ) by the decrease in   engenders complete suburbanization and 
hollowing-out of urban commercial centers. 
Complete suburbanization and hollowing-out of urban commercial centers brings improvement 
of social welfare because welfare improvement by greater availability of goods in region 2 and saving 
of transportation cost to region 2 exceeds the welfare loss incurred by the increase in transportation 
cost for consumers living near region 1. 
Under 235.01 40.65t  , IE does not exist in market equilibrium. However, the socially optimal 
boundary is 0 mb N  . Therefore, it means that location of a certain number of retail stores in the 
urban center should be promoted even though there is no potential for collective retail stores to locate 
in the urban center with some other retail stores from the perspective of social welfare maximization. 
Retail store concentration in the outskirts is often subject to control12 because suburbanization 
and the hollowing-out of urban commercial centers are believed to be inefficient from the conventional 
perspective of social welfare. However, our model shows that it is desirable given the existence of 
retail store monopolistic competition and shopping externality. 
 
5. Conclusion 
We have derived the mechanics generating a divergence of market boundary of retail stores 
between the market equilibrium and social optimum by constructing a model that introduces market 
failure. Although market failures of several kinds exist, we have specifically described two of them: 
 
12 Some policies have been implemented to promote urban center revitalization: improving transportation accessibility of 
an urban center and compact city policy are typical policies. Compact city policy leads residents, retail stores, and public 
facilities such as schools and hospitals to locate in a city center against the unregulated suburbanization and hollowing-out 
of the commerical center. 
0 mb N 
2t
 2 ,V n b b 2t
0 mb N  0mb  2t
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shopping externality for consumers and monopolistic competition of retail stores, which have greater 
influence on retail store location. 
Depending on the difference in   and  , stable multi-equilibria exist under the market 
equilibrium. If the difference is large, then only two CEs (  and ) exist. One is equal to 
the social optimum. If the difference is small, then both IE and CEs exist. In this case, consumers can 
be caught in a “utility trap”13. If one of the two CEs (  or ) comes into existence, then 
social welfare is less than IE. 
Even if IE comes into existence under a market equilibrium, it is different from the social 
optimum except for the case in which both regions are indifferent (  ). We showed that a 
commercial area’s market area is excessive if the accessibility from residential areas is better than that 
to another commercial area. 
We make three conclusions relating our theoretical conclusion with some issues of retail store 
location and social welfare change caused by transportation improvement. The first conclusion shows 
that, if the transportation cost to the city center is sufficiently smaller than that to the suburbs, then all 
retail stores concentrate in the city center. Given such a central agglomeration case, a decrease in 
transportation cost to the suburb can spur the emergence of suburban retail stores. This emergence 
invariably increases social welfare, which implies that an improvement in transportation to suburbs is 
desirable if it generates an increase in stores in the suburbs. In that case, policy-makers should not 
restrict suburban locations. 
The second conclusion shows that if the transportation cost to the city center is smaller than that 
to the suburb, the number of retail stores in the city center is greater than that in a social optimum, 
which implies that, in that case, promotion of retail stores’ location in the city center such as subsidies 
to locate in the city center or restrictions of location in the suburbs, worsens social welfare. Instead, 
promotion of stores’ location in the suburbs is preferred. 
Third, transportation improvement for the suburbs eventually generates complete 
suburbanization and hollowing-out of urban commercial centers, which is optimal from the perspective 
of social welfare. Complete suburbanization and hollowing-out of urban commercial centers brings a 
greater variety of goods in suburbs and savings of transportation costs to the suburbs, with benefits 
 
13 If there are many commercial areas, the probability of a utility trap is low because consumers can extricate themselves 
from a utility trap with a small quantity of individuals changing their shopping region at the same time. They can exit a 
utility trap by cooperating in choosing where to shop.  However, few actual commercial areas exist for consumers’ usual 
shopping behaviour, and it seems unrealistic that consumers will cooperate, even if the number of consumers is fairly small. 
Therefore, consumers can be caught in a utility trap. 
1t 2t
0mb  mb N
0mb  mb N
1 2t t
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exceeding the shortcomings of hollowing-out of urban commercial centers. 
Suburbanization and hollowing-out of urban commercial centers is believed to be inefficient 
from the conventional perspective of social welfare. Therefore, some policies have been implemented 
against suburbanization in many developed countries. Nevertheless, it is desirable in our model, 
because our model incorporates shopping externality and monopolistic competition among retail stores 
as factors exacerbating market failure; some other factors of market failure, such as agglomeration 
economies and congestion externality, are not addressed in the model. However, these factors, such as 
agglomeration economies and congestion externality, make little impact on location choices of 
individual retail stores. 
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APPENDICES 
A. Derivation of differentials of 1f  and 2f  
   p j m j  , the consumer expenditure on a good, is derived through formulation of consumer 
behavior as 
        i
i
p jp j m j p j MG
    
,   (A1) 
where  i i iM Y L G    is the solution of consumers’ utility maximization (2). Substituting 
 i i iM Y L G   and eq. (3) into (A1) yields      1 1p j m j Y n t f    for a good supplied in region 
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1 and       2 2p j m j Y N n t f     for a good supplied in region 2. The sum of the expenditure 
with respect to all consumers visiting each region is equal to the sales turnover of each retail store * *p q  
when the market boundary is b  ( 0 b N  ). This condition is shown as 
 * * 10 1
bp q Y n t dnf
    in region 1 and   * * 2
2
N
N bp q Y N n t dnf

     in region 2. 
Substituting eq. (5) and (6) into this condition yields 
  21 1 2
bf Y t bF


       and   
 2
2 2 2
N bf Y t N bF


       
. 
Therefore, the differentials of 1f  and 2f  with respect to their own market area are 
 1 1 0f Y b tb F


      and     2 2 0f Y N b tFN b        . 
B. Derivation of Property 2. 
If  1EX b  is larger/smaller than  2EX b  at mb  , then    1 1,V n b b EX b   is larger/smaller than 
   2 2,V n b b EX b    at mb   because    1 2, ,V n b b V n b b    . Therefore    1 1,V n b b EX b    and 
   2 2,V n b b EX b   intersect a point that is larger/smaller than mb  .  Accordingly, whether mb  is 
larger than sb  or not depends on whether or not  1EX b  is greater than  2EX b  at mb . 
     1 2m m mEX b EX b EX b    is derived from eqs. (11a) and (11b) as 
       
1 2
1 2




N b Y t b Y tEX b N bbY t Y t


                   
.  (B1) 
The denominator of eq. (A1) is positive. Therefore the sign of the numerator determines the sign of 
 mEX b . 
To ascertain the sign of the numerator in eq. (B1), we use some related expressions. First, from 
   1 2, ,m m m mV n b b V n b b    and eq. (4), we derive 
       1 11 1 2 2* *ln 1 ln ln ln 1 ln ln1 1Y L f Y L fp p
 
      







Y t b f
fY t N b

          
　 .   (B2) 
Second, as explained in the text, the decrease in 1t  affects the increase in budget for goods of 
consumers who visit the region. Therefore  1 ,V n b b moves upward. In consequence, mb  becomes 
larger and 1f  becomes larger because 1 0f b   . Therefore, if 1 2t t , then 1 2f f . 
If 1 2t t  , then 1 2f f   . Therefore  2 1m mY t N b Y t b        from eq. (B2). This is altered as 
 1 2 2 mY t Y t N b      . Substituting this relation into the numerator in eq. (B1), we obtain the 
following relation: 
          1 2 2 22m m m m mN b Y t b Y t N b Y t N b b Y t             . 
Altering the right hand side in this relation yields 
        1 2 22m m m mN b Y t b Y t N b Y t N b           , 
of which the first term on the right side is negative because 2mb N . The second term on the right 
side is positive. Therefore, we can derive the following relation: 
        1 2 22 0m m m mN b Y t b Y t N b Y t N b            . 
Accordingly,   0mEX b   if 1 2t t . Therefore, we can obtain the following relation: 
m sb b  if 1 2t t . 
In the same manner, the remaining property ( m sb b  if 1 2t t ) is also derived. 
 
